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Abstract. Collaborative research requires flexible and fine-grained ac-
cess control, beyond the common all-or-nothing access based purely on
authentication. Existing systems can be hard to use, and do not lend
themselves naturally to federation. We present an access-control archi-
tecture which builds on RDF’s natural strength as an integration frame-
work, which uses RDF scavenged from X.509 certificates, and policies
expressed as ontologies and SPARQL queries, to provide flexible and
distributed access control. We describe initial implementations.
Collaborative research often demands finer-grained security that goes beyond
the authentication-only paradigm of many e-Infrastructure systems. There are
solutions for finer-grained access control, but in our experience these are often
fragile, inflexible and difficult to establish, maintain and federate (for further
discussion of these problems, see [1], which focuses on just one use-case). In
this paper we present results of the JISC-funded AGAST project (www.nesc.
ac.uk/hub/projects/agast), illustrating an approach to the specification and
enforcement of security policies that is based on semantic technologies and the
natural integratability of RDF data, and which addresses many of the limitations
of existing security solutions. We illustrate the approach by describing sample
client implementations in two scientific disciplines.
There is a good deal of contemporary interest in authentication (‘AuthN’)
and identity technology, rather less so in authorisation (‘AuthZ’). This is at least
partly because this is hard, and that in turn is because the networked identities
(on which access-control decisions must be made) are and will remain hetero-
geneous, time-varying, and distributed. The AGAST architecture, based as it is
on the natural ‘webbiness’ of RDF and the associated standards of the Seman-
tic Web, is a much more natural fit to this distributed, and opportunistically
available identity and access-control information (ACI).
Existing technology in this area relies on distributed Attribute Authority
(AA) architectures such as Shibboleth (shibboleth.internet2.edu), and cen-
tralised ones such as VOMS [2]. The typical scenario is as follows: the AAs
communicate attributes to a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP, using the termi-
nology of X.812 [3]) using SAML or X.509 Attribute Certificates (AC); once
there, the role of the Policy Decision Point (PDP) is taken by a PERMIS sys-
tem (www.permis.org), which implements a role-based access control system to
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determine whether the available attributes indicate that the user has a suitable
role in a hierarchy represented by the PERMIS policy. Crucially, the role hierar-
chy is static, and the available attributes are fixed and globally pre-agreed; the
mapping of attributes to PERMIS roles is also fixed, and fundamentally based
on string comparison; there is no way to cope with attributes deliberately or
accidentally having different meanings at different AAs (for example a ‘lecturer’
at one institution may be allowed to borrow an unlimited number of books, but
the same role elsewhere may borrow only a limited number). That is, integration
is hard, and though federation can be made to work, it is not natural to do so.
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Fig. 1. The Semantic PDP architecture
We can use the natural integration features of RDF – its ‘webbiness’ – to
support much more flexible access control policy specification and subsequent
enforcement. For example: we may decide that a particular confidential resource
can be seen only by members of the class ns1:Medic, which consists of the union
of the classes ns1:Doctor and ns1:Nurse in some local or standard ontology.
We then wish to integrate the class ns2:Krankenschwester, which is an element
of an ‘ontology’ which may be an LDAP schema or AC attribute set, or be
otherwise derivable from a X.509 certificate; the ‘translators’ in Fig. 1 translate
this information into RDF. If we then state as an element of local policy that
ns2:Krankenschwester is a subclass of ns1:Nurse, then immediately anyone
whose (remote) credentials indicate they are of type ns2:Krankenschwester
is (locally deemed to be) provably a ns1:Nurse and thus also a ns1:Medic;
in this way distinct (PERMIS or other) role hierarchies can be aligned and
combined straightforwardly and robustly. This is a simple example: the point
is that expressing the access problem in RDF makes the relevant mappings
almost trivially expressible. Crucially, all of the components of this chain of
reasoning could potentially have come from different sources (interoperability),
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locally translated into RDF (the ‘RDF-native’ ACI of FOAF+SSL would be a
natural fit here). In this scenario, the policy information is expressed in the set
of available classes (and the mappings implied by the translators), the logical
relationships between the classes, the grant of access to members of one of the
classes, and the query which asks whether a user is a ns1:Medic. Reference [4]
uses a similar service-based PDP, but without the semantic policies.
This architecture has been implemented in the AGAST project through a
RESTful web-service acting as a PDP: Qadi. A PEP client of the service may
define a policy as an ontology, as illustrated above. When a user attempts to
access the service, the PEP obtains or extracts information about that user as
RDF, and uploads that to a newly-created ‘decider’ (this may simply require
posting the X.509 user- or attribute-certificate used for authentication). It then
asks the decider ‘is the user X in the class of entities permitted access?’, to
which the Qadi service can reply with a simple yes or no, which the PEP can
act upon by permitting or denying the user access. The policy is expressed
in the combination of the uploaded ontology and the SPARQL query used to
interrogate it.
We have implemented case-studies using this architecture, in the context
of clinical trials (VOTES, www.nesc.ac.uk/hub/projects/votes), and remote
processing in astronomy. We will discuss both use-cases in detail, confirming
the basic feasibility of the approach, and confirming that the server software is
indeed substantially easier to set up and configure, and the client software easier
to integrate, than existing well-developed approaches.
In summary: users have and will retain multiple identities and numerous pre-
existing permissions to resources, and semantic web approaches can integrate
these resources, and allow us to reason with them, in a natural way.
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